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Abstract
Since the Global Financial Crisis, the Group of Twenty (G20) has not
only become the premier forum for policy coordination among major
economies but has also played an important role in promoting reforms
to safeguard global financial stability. This paper focuses on the com-
mitments the G20 has made to strengthen the Global Financial Safety
since its first Leaders’ Summit in Washington, D.C. in 2008. This pa-
per first compares reform proposals that the G20 achieved and those
it did not during the subsequent six years, or by the 2014 Summit in
Australia. The paper finds that reforms aimed at enhancing financial
resources and renewing instruments for emergency liquidity provision
were substantially implemented. However, institutional reforms con-
cerning the governing structure of International Financial Institutions
were delayed. The paper then analyses, from a political economic per-
spective, why the G20 delivered on the first set of reforms, but not
on the second. The urgency of responding to the crisis, the role of
particular countries as well as institutional characteristics of the G20
framework determine the political interests in this reform area.
JEL Classification: F33, F53, F55
Keywords: Global Financial Safety Net, G20, International Monetary
Fund, Regional Financing Arrangements
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1 Introduction
In a world of increasingly integrated capital markets, the Global Financial
Crisis (GFC) and subsequent European financial instability underscored the
necessity of setting up credible financial backstops for crisis prevention and
resolution. On the one hand, countries that are under severe financial strain
may be excluded from capital markets and need to seek immediate alternative
financing assistance. On the other, countries with sound domestic policies
and fundamentals may also suffer from sudden capital flow reversals spurred
by heightened financial market risk aversion or spillovers from other coun-
tries. Policymakers must therefore design the appropriate policies to provide
financing to crisis-hit countries while encouraging them to correct domestic
policy failures. They must also protect countries with sound policies and
fundamentals from unexpected — even often irrational — changes in market
participants’ behaviour. Enhancing financial safety nets worldwide would be
a key component of the policy responses to address these issues.
As many researchers (e.g. Eichengreen 2012 and Hawkins et al. 2014)
point out, the post-World War II safety nets have primarily centred on the
Bretton Woods institutions. While the World Bank has been the main driver
of post-war reconstruction and long-term project financing for growth, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has always been a privileged global plat-
form for macroeconomic policy coordination and for the resolution of balance-
of-payments crises.1 But the continued stigmatisation of IMF financial pro-
grammes and the unprecedented magnitude of the 2009 crisis encouraged the
development of supplementary layers of financial safety nets. In this context,
the Korean government — the 2010 chair of the Group of Twenty (G20)
— promoted the strengthening of the multi-layered Global Financial Safety
Net (GFSN), as a resilient backstop to the International Monetary System
(IMS).
1This paper will focus on liquidity provision in times of crises, which is the mandate of
the IMF and other regional financing arrangements. Notwithstanding their importance,
the World Bank and other Multilateral Development Banks will not be the main focus of
this paper as they provide financing for a very different rationale, i.e. long-term growth
financing.
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The GFSN can be broadly defined as a set of institutional arrange-
ments that provide financial resources to countries that need either insur-
ance against potential shocks or funding for crisis resolution. The objective
of these arrangements is to help a country in crisis restore its self-financing
capacity and correct its domestic policy failures through appropriate condi-
tionality. These institutional arrangements will also serve as a backstop to
limit contagion effects from the crisis country to other parts of the world.
The multi-layered nature of the GFSN refers to the different origins of the
financing resources. In fact, academics and policy-makers tend to agree on
four distinct layers for crisis prevention and resolution: 1) a national line
of defence including foreign reserves and sufficient fiscal space, 2) bilateral
swap lines between Central Banks, 3) a regional line of defence from Regional
Financing Arrangements (RFAs), and 4) ultimately a global line of defence
with the IMF at the centre.
Since 2008, when the G20 Leaders’ Summit emerged as a “premier”
framework for global policy coordination, these 20 industrialised and emerg-
ing market economies initiated reforms aiming to strengthen the GFSN. Sig-
nificant progress has been achieved so far. First, considering the insufficient
size of existing safety net resources to cope with the 2009 crisis, G20 coun-
tries urged enhancement of the lending capacity in the existing International
Financial Institutions (IFIs). To name only a few accomplishments in this
regard, the IMF’s lending resources have been tripled, new precautionary in-
struments designed and emergency lending conditions relaxed. Second, G20
countries promoted further development and institutionalisation of RFAs to
complement the global line of defence. The European Financial Stability
Facility (EFSF) and European Stability Mechanism (ESM) were created
in Europe; the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) of bilateral swap lines among
ASEAN+3 countries evolved into a fully multilateralised framework. Third,
the G20 has been advocating a rationalisation in using different resources in
the GFSN to avoid over-reliance on any single layer, notably foreign reserves
as a self-insurance tool. Despite the above-cited achievements, the G20 coun-
tries were less successful at implementing other areas of their reform agenda.
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For instance, long-term institutional reforms at the IMF were delayed and
institutionalisation of bilateral swap lines among Central Banks — as the
Korean government had long advocated — were completely dropped from
the official reform agenda.
Six years after the first G20 Leaders’ Summit in Washington at the height
of the crisis, this paper aims at assessing the progress countries have made
regarding the comprehensive reform package on GFSN. Based on a careful
examination of the G20 official communique´s from 2008 to 2014, in this paper
I first distinguish between the commitments that the G20 delivered on and
those that they delayed or dropped. Then I propose a political economic
reading of the “push” factors that encouraged countries to deliver and the
“pull” factors that slowed implementation. The major push factors were
the need to respond urgently to the crisis and the endorsement and agenda
setting power of the G20, especially the role played by the chairing country.
The main pull factors, in contrast, were some weaknesses in the institutional
setting of the G20 framework as well as conflicting and evolving national
interests.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief
review of the recent literature on the G20 and GFSN. Section 3 presents the
official documents and data based on which the analysis is made. Section 4
identifies which commitments on strengthening the GFSN were delivered and
which not. Section 5 proposes an analysis of push and pull factors influencing
the cycle of political interests in GFSN-related issues. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
To my knowledge, this is the first paper that proposes a comprehensive as-
sessment of G20 commitments specific to the GFSN and its components.
It draws inspiration from three distinct strands of literature: institutional
setting and power of the G20; literature on the evaluation of G20 reform
agendas; and literature of mixed nature on the recent development of the
GFSN and RFAs.
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Regarding the internal and external power bargaining of the G20 frame-
work, Eccleston et al. (2014) highlight the “endorsement function” of the
G20. They argue that by shaping the global reform agenda, G20 is not a
“toothless talkshop” but has been active and successful in a number of is-
sue areas. Callaghan (2013) sees the involvement of political leaders of the
highest level as an inherent strength of the G20 framework and recognises
the agenda-setting power of the chairing country. Wade (2011) proposes an
in-depth analysis of the role the BRICS countries have played in the G20
and other IFIs in recent years.
There are also an increasing number of papers that assess or quan-
titatively evaluate the deliverables and the impact of some key G20 re-
form proposals. Ve´ron (2014) takes stock of deliverables of the G20 finan-
cial reform agenda fives after the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Washington in
2008. Similar in approach, my work focuses on GFSN-related proposals.
Lo Duca and Stracca (2014) constructed a database of G20 offcial commu-
nique´s from 2008 to 2013 to evaluate the impact of G20 meetings on the
volatility of financial markets. They find that “the information and decision
content of G20 Summits is of limited relevance for [financial] market partici-
pants.” Larionova (2011) compares the effectiveness of G8 and G20 regarding
global governance reforms. Truman (2011) evaluates the G20 commitments
regarding IMF reforms. Truman’s paper, however, only focuses on one G20
Summit - the Cannes Summit under the French presidency. A number of
important new conferences, working group seminars and Leaders’ Summits
took place afterwards. My paper thus extends Truman’s analysis to cover
the entire period from October 2008 to November 2014.
Several recent papers also study the development of the different layers
of the GFSN since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis. A few IMF staff
policy papers provide evidence that “the multilayered approach to liquidity
provision helped mitigate the effects of systemic crises, but only in a limited
way (IMF 2014a).” At the global level, the “use of Fund resources in large
and frontloaded amounts, and increased recourse to precautionary financing
generally helped restore market access more rapidly than in past crises (IMF
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2014a).” At the regional level, IMF (2013) provides an overview of existing
RFAs in the world and of their recent development. Rhee et al. (2013) focus
more on the newly established RFAs in Europe and in Asia.2
Recently, researchers have also worked on potential cooperation between
RFAs and the IMF. Henning (2011) and Eichengreen (2012) stress, from
different angles, the need for effective and more formalized cooperation be-
tween regional and multilateral financing arrangements. Moreover, although
Eichengreen (2010) thinks resources at the disposal of RFAs are not sufficient,
Hawkins et al. (2014) express their concerns that the increased lending ca-
pacity of a number of RFAs could seriously challenge the central role of the
IMF in safeguarding global financial stability. Jeanne (2010), Kawai (2010)
and Ocampo and Titelman (2012) advocate a clear division of labour be-
tween RFAs and the Fund. Jeanne (2010) suggests a “two-tier system” in
which “a RFA lends up to a certain amount, which can be increased by Fund
lending associated with stringent conditionality.” Sussangkarn (2011) argues
that RFAs should act as first line of defence by providing short-term liquidity
with no conditionality.
Although very much inspired by the existing literature, my paper places
emphasises on what G20 countries have promised regarding the GFSN and
in particular RFAs, and proposes a political economy analysis of the “push”
and “pull” factors driving G20 countries’ political interests in this issue area.
3 Methodology and data
In this paper, I mainly adopt a political economy approach. For this purpose,
I gathered relevant information from the official documents of G20 meetings
from 2008 to 2014, including both Leaders’ Summits and meetings of Finance
2For a detailed account on the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) and the Chiang Mai Ini-
tiative Multilateralisation (CMIM), please see Henning (2009), Sussangkarn (2011) and
Hill and Menon (2012); regarding the Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas (FLAR), see
Ocampo and Titelman (2012) and Titelman et al. (2012). Unfortunately, there are not
many detailed and systematic works on the evolution of RFAs in Europe.
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Ministers and Central Bank Governors. In total, 9 communique´s and corre-
sponding annexes from G20 Leaders’ Summits, 24 comminique´s of Finance
Ministers and Central Bank Governors meetings (sometimes jointly with the
International Monetary and Financial Committee-IMFC) are used to iden-
tify the commitments made by G20 countries regarding strengthening the
GFSN. To study the progress or achievements in delivering these commit-
ments, I have examined IMF and World Bank press releases, legal documents
of different RFAs, speeches by Finance Ministers and Central Bank Gover-
nors of selected G20 countries (e.g. Korea and France), minutes of co-chairs
meetings and reports from high-level seminars on the GFSN organised under
the aegis of the G20. Table 1 presents the list of the meetings considered in
this paper (Leaders’ Summits are highlighted in green and technical seminars
in red).
In addition to a qualitative analysis of the official texts, I have also
counted the occurrence of keywords on the GFSN and their components,
in order to assess quantitatively the evolution of political interests in GFSN-
related issues. Table 2 summarizes the keywords taken into account. Addi-
tional information on these G20 meetings is also extracted from the database
constructed by Lo Duca and Stracca (2014).
4 Achievements and missed targets: an eval-
uation of G20 commitments on GFSN
G20 Leaders have been concerned with the insufficient size and institutional
setting of financial backstops to shore up the IMS since their first Lead-
ers’ Summit in 2008. They mandated Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors at the Toronto Summit (June 2010) to prepare policy options to
strengthen the GFSN for their consideration at the Seoul Summit (November
2010). Based on a detailed inventory of G20 official communique´s (see Ap-
pendix A), I present in this section which reform proposals on strengthening
the GFSN were achieved and which were missed.
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Table 1: List of G20 Meetings
Date City Level Reference
11 Oct. 2008 Washington Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
8-9 Nov. 2008 Sao Paulo Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
14-15 Nov. 2008 Washington Leader Leaders’ declaration and action plan
14 Mar. 2009 Horsham Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
2 Apr. 2009 London Leader Leaders’ declaration and annexes
24 Apr. 2009 Washington Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
4-5 Sep. 2009 London Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
24-25 Sep. 2009 Pittsburgh Leader Leaders’ declaration and documents
6-7 Nov. 2009 St. Andrews Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
22-23 Apr. 2010 Washington Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
4-5 Jun. 2010 Busan Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
26-27 Jun. 2010 Toronto Leader Leaders’ declaration and annexes (Annex 3)
22-23 Oct. 2010 Gyeongju Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
11-12 Nov. 2010 Seoul Leader Leaders’ declaration and Summit document
18-19 Feb. 2011 Paris Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
31 Mar. 2011 Nanjing Technical DSK, Nicolas Sarkozy speeches
14-15 Apr. 2011 Washington Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
22-23 Sep. 2011 Washington Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
14-15 Oct. 2011 Paris Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
3-4 Nov. 2011 Cannes Leader Leaders’ declaration
25-26 Feb. 2012 Mexico City Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
20 Apr. 2012 Washington Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
20 Apr. 2012 Washington Ministerial Joint Statement by IMFC/G20
18-19 Jun. 2012 Los Cabos Leader Leaders’ declaration
4-5 Nov. 2012 Mexico City Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
15-16 Feb. 2013 Moscow Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
17-18 Apr. 2013 Washington Technical Issues Note for G20/IMF Seminar
18-19 Apr.2013 Washington Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
19-20 Jul. 2013 Moscow Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
5-6 Sep. 2013 St. Petersburg Leader Leaders’ declaration
10-11 Oct. 2013 Washington Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
18-19 Dec. 2013 Seoul Technical G20 Seoul Conference
22-23 Feb. 2014 Sydney Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
10-11 Apr. 2014 Washington Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
20-21 Sep. 2014 Cairns Ministerial Fin Ministers and CB Governors Communique´
15-16 Nov. 2014 Brisbane Leader Leaders’ declaration Action plan
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Table 2: Keyword Count
Field Keywords
Global line of defence global financial safety net, international fi-
nancial architecture, international monetary
system
Regional line of defence regional financing (financial) arrangements,
regional facility or specific mention of a RFA
(e.g. EFSF, ESM, etc.)
National line of defence bilateral swap lines, joint Central Bank ac-
tions, foreign (international) reserves, self-
insurance, counter-cyclical fiscal policy
4.1 The global line of defence
At the global level, the G20’s proposed reforms cover three issue areas: 1)
overall size of lending capacity of existing IFIs, especially the IMF, 2) new
lending instruments and the streamlined borrowing conditions, and 3) insti-
tutional and governance reforms at the IMF.
4.1.1 Increased lending resources at the IMF
In the inaugural G20 Leaders’ Summit in Washington in November 2008,
political leaders were committed to ensure “that the IMF, World Bank and
other MDBs [Multilateral Development Banks] have sufficient resources to
continue playing their role in overcoming the crisis” and “to restore growth,
avoid negative spillovers and support emerging market economies and devel-
oping countries (G20 Washington Communique´).”
Enlargement of lending resources both at the World Bank and the IMF
was quickly agreed, only five months after the Washington Summit. $850 bil-
lion of additional resources will be deployed to support growth “by helping
to finance counter-cyclical spending, bank recapitalisation, infrastructure,
trade finance, balance of payments support, debt rollover, and social sup-
port (G20 London Communique´).” Of the total $850 billion, IMF members
make $250 billion available through bilateral loans. Another $500 billion
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increase comes from expanded and more flexible New Arrangements to Bor-
row (NAB). This total resource increase of $750 billion in the IMF was fully
delivered by September 2009 and was announced as an achievement at the
2009 Pittsburgh G20 Leaders’ Summit. Only 10 months have passed from
the origination of the political initiative to its full implementation; it can
be considered a quick success by the standards of IFI decision making. The
remaining $100 billion tranche was achieved by increasing MDB lending to
low-income countries, delivered in April 2010.
In addition to the mobilisation of financial resources for emergency lend-
ing, the capital in MDBs had been increased by $350 billion by June 2010
(promised at the 2009 Pittsburgh G20 Leaders’ Summit). The IMF also
implemented a $250 billion equivalent new general allocation in SDRs in Au-
gust 2009 when the Fourth Amendment to the Articles of Agreement became
effective. This increase in SDR allocation was independent of the G20’s con-
sideration of emergency lending. According to the IMF this increase “played
a critical role in providing liquidity to the global economic system and supple-
menting member countries’ official reserves amid the global financial crisis.”3
G20 Leaders welcomed this new SDR allocation at the 2010 Toronto Summit.
4.1.2 An enhanced toolbox for emergency lending
The second item on the global line of defence reform agenda aims at ame-
liorating and enriching the Fund’s lending toolbox, especially in respect of
precautionary instruments. Like the reform on lending resources, G20 coun-
tries have urged “the ongoing review of [the IMF’s] instruments and facilities
to ensure flexibility (G20 Washington Communique´)” since 2008.
Due to large spillover effects from the crisis, the IMF has been placing
an increasing emphasis on new precautionary instruments for countries with
sound — even very sound — domestic policies and fundamentals. The Flexi-
ble Credit Line (FCL) was introduced in April 2009 and further enhanced in
August 2010. This credit line instrument is designed for countries with very
3See http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm.
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strong fundamentals and provides large and upfront access to IMF resources,
mainly as a form of insurance for crisis prevention. One should note that
there are no ex post policy conditions attached to this instrument. Mexico,
Colombia and Poland have requested this precautionary line that gives access
to over $100 billion; no drawings had been made as of September 2015. Ac-
cording to IMF (2014c), the use of the FCL has sent “positive externalities”
to markets as spreads narrowed for a set of countries well beyond the three re-
questing members. Furthermore, a precautionary instrument has also been
designed for crisis bystander countries with sound economic fundamentals
but with some remaining vulnerabilities. This is the Precautionary Credit
Line (PCL) created in October 2010 which further evolved into the Precau-
tionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) in 2011. The qualification bar for PLL is
lower than for FCL. Currently, Macedonia and Morocco have asked to use
this instrument. Notice that at an earlier stage of the crisis, in October 2008,
the IMF Executive Board also approved an emergency financing tool, named
the Short-term Liquidity Facility (SLF). However, this instrument was never
used and quickly became unsuitable as the Global Financial Crisis deepened.
Some fundamental features of the SLF were incorporated into the FCL.
Table 3 compares the newly created IMF lending instruments (SLF, FCL,
PLL) with more traditional IMF instruments (Stand-By Arrangements or
SBA). We can clearly see that the newly created ones have more exacting
qualification requirements stronger requirement in terms of qualification but
provide higher upfront access limits without stringent conditionality.
Second, regarding crisis resolution, the IMF has also streamlined con-
ditions attached to loans in order to assist countries severely hit by crises.
IMF (2011) shows that the number of structural conditions attached to SBAs
approved between September 2008 and 2010 decreased significantly in com-
parison with previous programmes designed in the periods of 2002-2004 and
2005-2007.
As for missed targets or challenges regarding the lending toolbox of the
IMF, one should note that the modality of IMF programmes was designed
60 years ago for balance-of-payments problems when major economies were
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Table 3: Comparative table of IMF lending instruments
SLF FCL PLL SBA
Use Systemic events Crisis pre-
vention and
resolution
Crisis preven-
tion only
Any time
Qualification Sound policies Very strong
policies
Sound policies No
Ex post con-
ditionality
No No Yes (semi-
annual review)
yes (reviews and
performance cri-
teria)
Access cap Ad hoc cap Uncapped Cap of 1000%
of quota with
500% maxi-
mum access at
approval
No hard cap
Length 6 months, re-
newable
up to 2 years, re-
newable
btw 1 to 2 years,
renewable
12-18 months,
up to 3 years if
needed
in a fixed exchange rate arrangement, e.g. the Bretton Woods System. The
nature of crises has evolved even since. Therefore, the IMF’s current toolbox
is not well-tailored to deal with sovereign debt issues or recapitalisation of
financial institutions. This is why the IMF could not provide financial as-
sistance to Spain in 2012 when the Spanish government needed funding to
cover a capital shortfall in a number of Spanish banks. Moreover, except the
policy on Lending into Arrears and the Exceptional Access Policy, there is
no coherent and systematic framework for the IMF to specifically deal with
sovereign debt distress. Furthermore, although sitting on a large pile of fi-
nancial resources, the IMF only provides short-term financing, as it expects
to catalyse private flows for countries hit by crises (see Erce 2012). However,
in the case of sovereign debt distress, providing long-term financing may be
indispensable to help a country regain sustainable market access. A few IMF
policy papers, e.g. IMF (2014a) and IMF (2014b), have looked into these
questions and proposed some policy solutions.
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4.1.3 Institutional and governance reforms
As the leading institution at the centre of the GFSN, the IMF, however,
has suffered from an identity crisis since the mid-2000s. With the growing
contribution of emerging market and developing countries to world economic
growth, the under-representation of this group of countries at the IMF seems
increasingly alarming. As a policy coordination forum for both advanced
countries and emerging market economies, the G20 has endorsed governance
and voice reforms in the IMF to strengthen the latter’s legitimacy. In fact,
from 2008 to 2014, the IMF governance reforms have been a recurring theme
in all G20 Leaders’ Summits (Figure 4 traces the occurrence of “IMF reforms”
in G20 communique´s).
In terms of achievements, the IMF’s 2008 Quota and Voice Reforms took
effect in March 2011 after almost three years of national ratification process.
This constitutes the biggest step forward in terms of institutional reforms
in the IMF in the past decade. The entering into force of the 2008 Re-
forms increased 54 countries’ quota share amounting to SDR 29.8 billion,4
enhanced the voice and participation of low-income countries through an
almost tripling of the basic votes for them and enabled Executive Directors
representing seven or more members to appoint a second Alternate Executive
Director.
In the Gyeongju meeting of G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors (October 2010), the G20 countries agreed an even more ambi-
tious set of proposals, the 2010 Reform of Quotas and Governance. The
IMF Board of Governors approved these proposals under the 14th General
Review of Quotas on December 15, 2010. Compared to the 2008 reforms,
the 2010 reform package includes a doubling of quotas, which was to result
in more than 6% shift in quota share to dynamic emerging market and de-
veloping countries while protecting the voting shares of the poorest member
states. The reform package also includes a more representative, fully-elected
Executive Board. Unfortunately, this 2010 governance reform package has
not been ratified. Although more than a sufficient number of countries have
4China, Korea, India, Brazil, and Mexico are the largest beneficiaries.
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accepted the amendments to the Articles of Agreements, requirement for the
Governance Reform to become effective, they do not represent enough of the
Fund’s voting power.5 To a large extent, “the [2010] quota reform is still
waiting on the United States (Truman, 2014).”
4.2 The regional line of defence
4.2.1 Creation, institutionalisation and replenishment of RFAs
The European experience in dealing with recent crises sheds light on the im-
portance of mobilizing regional financial resources to complement the IMF’s
lending. The total resources available at existing RFAs ($1.2 trillion in 2014)
almost reached the same level as that of the IMF ($1.4 trillion in 2014).
Figure 1 compares the size and lending capacity of existing RFAs across the
world.
The creation of the EFSF in 2010 and its evolution into the ESM in
2012 constituted a quick response to the severity of the European debt cri-
sis. Backed by either guarantees or direct capital contributions from euro
area member states,6 the EFSF and ESM together have a lending capacity
of e700 billion, covering 6.2% of member states’ total GDP and 950% of
members’ aggregate quota shares in the IMF. As of September 2015, the
EFSF and ESM together disbursed e250 billion to five programme coun-
tries — Greece,7 Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus, exceeding three times
the total disbursement from the IMF General Resources Account during the
same period. Two specificities about these newly founded European RFAs
merit our attention. First, the EFSF and ESM both finance their activi-
ties by issuing bonds and bills while the IMF mostly relies on member state
contributions. Second, the EFSF and ESM possess more tools for financial
assistance than the IMF. For example, both RFAs can undertake primary
5As of September 2014, countries representing 77% of the 85% voting power required
have ratified the 2010 reform package.
6Note that not all current euro area member states take part in the EFSF. Latvia and
Lithuania joined the euro area after the EFSF ceased to grant new programmes so that
these two countries are only members of the ESM.
7Including the third financial assistance programme for Greece.
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and secondary market purchases, as well as recapitalize banks through loans
to governments. In addition, since December 2014, the ESM Board of Gover-
nors adopted a new financial assistance instrument for the ESM, the so-called
“Direct Recapitalisation of Institutions (DRI)”.8
In Europe, several crisis resolution mechanisms with different country
coverage and lending capacity preceded the creation of the EFSF and ESM.
The EU created a balance of payment assistance facility (EU BoPF) in the
1970s; it raised the lending capacity of the facility twice recently, reaching
e50 billion in 2009. It provides financial assistance to nine non-euro area
countries. The EU 28 reproduced an equivalent mechanism to help resolve
the euro area crisis in May 2010: the European Financial Stabilisation Mech-
anism (EFSM) with a lending capacity of e60 billion. It was activated for
Ireland and Portugal with available financial resources up to e48.5 billion.
A few other RFAs have also been created elsewhere in recent years. An
Anti-Crisis Fund (ACF) of the Eurasian Economic Community was founded
in July 2009 by Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Russia and
Tajikistan. Uniquely financed by members’ capital contributions, the ACF
has a total lending capacity of $8.5 billion; Tajikistan and Belarus have both
benefited from this regional facility.
Asia made a significant step toward stronger regional coordination in cri-
sis prevention in 2010. On March 24, 2010, the existing bilateral swap line
agreements — Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) — were merged into a single con-
tract under the name of Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM).
It covers 10 ASEAN countries plus China, Japan and South Korea. The
total size of CMIM has been twice increased during the recent financial cri-
sis, from $78 billion in 2008 to $240 billion in 2012. A surveillance unit for
the CMIM — the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) —
was also created in 2011 in order to “monitor and analyse regional economies
and to contribute to early detection of risks, swift implementation of remedial
8The DRI is an element of a wider package of instruments that have been introduced
to support the euro area’s Banking Union. It may be used in very specific circumstances
to recapitalise euro area financial institutions as a last resort when all other instruments,
including the bail-in mechanism, have been applied.
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actions and effective decision-making of the CMIM.”9
Finally, in July 2014, the five biggest emerging market economies (Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa, or BRICS) signed the Treaty estab-
lishing BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). This newest RFA is
endowed with $100 billion capital and is composed of multilateral swap lines
akin to those of the CMIM.
4.2.2 Towards effective RFA-IMF cooperation
If the creation of new RFAs or institutionalisation of existing ones were not,
strictly speaking, a G20 initiative, the G20 has endorsed reflections on how
to promote cooperation between RFAs and the IMF, as well as among RFAs.
This question has become challenging as some policy-makers and researchers
see an increasing risk of moral hazard from RFA enlargement. Hawkins et al.
(2014) formulate this issue in a concise way: “[t]he rise of regional arrange-
ments has changed the balance of resources in the safety net. A significantly
over-resourced global financial safety net would encourage countries to seek
assistance on as favourable terms as possible. Competition between the IMF
and other institutions would put at risk the importance of policy condition-
ality and introduce a greater risk of moral hazard.”
To facilitate common thinking on how to promote inter-institutional co-
operation, several seminars gathering together economic technocrats and re-
searchers have been officially organised under the aegis of the G20. For
instance, a co-chair report was prepared for the consideration of G20 Fi-
nance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in 2010, and high-level semi-
nars convening officials from RFAs and the IMF were organised in April and
December 2013.
The major achievement in this field consists of the adoption of Principles
for cooperation between the IMF and RFAs by G20 Finance Ministers and
Central Bank Governors in November 2011. Europe and ASEAN+3, as the
host of the biggest RFAs, were the major contributors to the establishment
of these common principles. These principles call for both ex ante and ex
9See http://www.amro-asia.org.
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Figure 1: RFAs’ lending capacities [Notes: GDP data as of the fourth quarter of
2013 from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. GDP data are missing for
Myanmar, Palestine, Somalia and Syria. Sources: RFA official documents; IMF; World
Bank; ESM calculations.]
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post cooperation. Not only should the IMF be encouraged to help RFAs to
build capacity for crisis prevention, the IMF and RFAs should work together
for crisis financing as well. In terms of lending conditions, institutions need
to find the right balance in terms of consistency and flexibility. Finally, the
IMF’s preferred creditor status must, in any case, be guaranteed.
Concrete examples of how the IMF and RFAs work together at the oper-
ational level remain, however, scarce. A few issues, especially regarding the
making of conditionality, still need to be tackled appropriately.
Based on the financial assistance programmes in Europe and the statutes
of a number of RFAs, the cooperation between the IMF and RFAs can be
envisaged in several ways. First, regarding the decision-making process for
a regional financing programme, the IMF’s good seal of approval may be
required. The US Treasury Secretary requires a formal letter from the Man-
aging Director of the IMF before any mobilisation of resources under the
North American Framework Arrangement (NAFA). Similarly, although the
treaties establishing the EFSF and ESM only indicate that they can liaise
with the IMF when making financing programmes, in practice the IMF’s
opinion has been solicited. Second, the IMF and RFAs can co-finance an
assistance programme. CMIM and BRICS CRA have clearly made a tranche
of their regional financing conditional on a simultaneous IMF assistance pro-
gramme; 70% of the maximum access under BRICS CRA and 60% under
CMIM are thus called “IMF-linked access”. In the same spirit, the IMF’s
financing has also been solicited under the EU BoPF. Figure 2 compares
the RFAs differing requirements on involving the the IMF both in decision-
making and co-financing.
Third and most importantly, one needs to think about whether the IMF
or a RFA or they jointly define the ex post conditionality and carries out
programme monitoring and surveillance. The IMF has long-established ex-
pertise in financial programme design, monitoring and surveillance. However,
the Fund’s assistance is often “stigmatised” and requesting countries com-
plain about the lack of country ownership. This is also a dilemma for RFAs.
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Figure 2: IMF - RFA cooperation [Sources: RFA official documents]
If lending conditions are accommodative in regional mechanisms, this would
create “programme shopping” for countries in need of financial assistance,
thus generating severe moral hazard problems. On the contrary, if the con-
ditions are too stringent and deprive national authorities of the opportunity
to participate in the programme-making process, RFAs may suffer from the
same reputation problem as the Fund. Moreover, the IMF has wider repre-
sentation and can be regarded as a more neutral referee in defining lending
conditions. The situation may differ for RFAs, as it is generally badly per-
ceived if a dominant economy in a region dictates lending conditions to a
borrower in the same region. For instance, it would be difficult to imagine
that China imposes conditionality on India or that Japan imposes condition-
ality on Korea under the CMIM. This is an open question that needs further
exploration.
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4.3 The national line of defence and bilateral arrange-
ments
4.3.1 Rationalized reserve accumulation
Foreign reserve accumulation, as a self-insurance tool, has proved its effective-
ness in coping with the Global Financial Crisis, as a number of recent studies
demonstrate (see Dominguez et al. 2012 and Bussie`re et al. 2015). However,
over-reliance on foreign reserves risks aggravating global imbalances that may
have contributed to the onset of the crisis. Moreover, there is no consensus in
the academic literature on the optimal stock of foreign reserves for a country
as precautionary savings. As the largest reserve holding countries, a few G20
member states — Brazil, China, Japan, Korea, Russia, and Saudi Arabia —
have suffered from strong external pressure to slow down their stockpiling.
G20 countries conveyed the idea that accumulating reserves may not be
an overall stabilizing factor for the IMS. As a result, in February 2011, they
agreed on a set of indicators to assess external imbalances, known as “Indica-
tive Guidelines” and encouraged the Mutual Assessment Procedure (MAP) in
order to track the evolution of major countries’ balance-of-payments. More-
over, they also encouraged a culture of diversified financial cushions for crisis
prevention and management, with foreign reserves as just one layer.
In recent years, researchers have observed a general slowing-down in re-
serve accumulation, especially in countries that had a large pre-crisis reserve
stock (see Bussie`re et al. 2014). Aizenman et al. (2015) especially argue that
Central Bank bilateral swap lines constitute useful substitutes to foreign re-
serves for crisis prevention purposes.
4.3.2 Central bank coordinated actions and bilateral swap lines
During the Korean presidency of G20 meetings in 2010, the Bank of Ko-
rea also suggested institutionalising bilateral Central Bank swap lines. The
Korean experience in managing capital reversals during the Global Finan-
cial Crisis demonstrated the importance of Central Bank bilateral swap lines
in smoothing capital flow volatilities. Academic research proved that “the
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dollar swap lines among central banks were effective at reducing the dollar
funding pressures abroad and stresses in money markets (Goldberg et al.,
2010)”. G20 countries also recognized that “central banks play a major role
in addressing liquidity shocks at a global and regional level, as shown by the
recent improvements in regional swap lines such as in East Asia (G20 Cannes
Summit Communique´)”.
However, bilateral swap lines have not been institutionalised worldwide,
with exception of the CMIM and BRICS CRA. This topic was completely
dropped from the G20 reform agenda, despite the Korean government’s per-
severance.
5 “Push” and “pull” factors driving the cycle
of political interests in delivering
In the previous section, I presented the reform proposals on the GFSN that
had been achieved and those that had not. In this section, I identify the
factors that have “pushed” G20 countries to deliver on their promises and
those that have “pulled” countries away from delivering. A clear scrutiny of
what drives the cycle of political interests in delivering will be necessary to
understand the relative success of G20 reform agendas.
There are several “usual suspects” for our consideration: 1) the role of
the crisis, 2) particular national interests and 3) institutional characteristics
of the G20 framework.
5.1 GFSN-related reforms in times of crises
As Ostry and Ghosh (2013) argue, delivering on key reforms is more likely
“during periods of crisis when the counterfactual to coordination may be a
seismic global event.” In fact, in recent crises, major economies adopted a cri-
sis logic that is “not to ask any questions but provide emergency financing”.
This crisis logic largely explains why reform items that aim to increase imme-
diate financial capacity (e.g. replenishing lending resources in existing IFIs
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or creating new precautionary instruments in the IMF) were implemented
quickly while long-term institutional reforms often lagged behind.
The creation of new RFAs, especially in Europe, has also been propelled
by the urgent need to deal with regional financial tremors. Considering that
financing needs in Europe exceeded those of any previous IMF programmes,
pooling regional resources turned out to be indispensable. From a histori-
cal perspective, Figure 3 shows that RFAs are often set up during or in the
immediate aftermath of a severe regional crisis. For instance, the Arab Mone-
tary Fund (AMF) was created in the context of massive balance-of-payments
imbalances in the Middle East and North Africa; the Fondo Latinoameri-
cano de Reservas (FLAR) was set up during the Latin American crisis of the
1980s. ACF, EFSM, CMIM, EFSF and ESM were all created to deal with
the Global Financial Crisis or the subsequent European crisis. Their ample
lending capacity is highly likely to be correlated with the magnitude of these
recent crises.
However, the incentives for providing emergency funding could quickly
fade away once the pressure of “critical junctures” has eased. Countries’
focus may shift to more preventive aspects of crisis management. Figure 4
shows that the political interest in GFSN-related issues decreased after two
peaks in 2010 and 2013, respectively.
Moreover, a careful examination of G20 comminique´s shows that G20
countries’ interest in safeguarding global financial stability has shifted from
in-crisis financing to ex ante regulation of the financial sector. In fact, once
the immediate need for crisis financing was alleviated, it was a natural move
for political leaders to tackle the roots of the crisis. Why the private sec-
tor had accumulated excessive exposure to currency mismatches ex ante or
why large banks had taken over considerable market risks have become more
imminent issues to solve. In this context, most discussions in G20 meetings
since 2013 have concentrated (once again) on financial regulations or tax-
related issues, such as harmonisation of rules governing Over-The-Counter
(OTC) operations, supervision and resolution of systemically important fi-
nancial institutions (SIFIs) or the G20/OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shift-
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ing (BEPS), etc. Only the pending IMF 2010 reform package was mentioned
as a GFSN-related item in the last G20 Leaders’ Summit in Brisbane.
Figure 3: RFAs created in times of crises [Notes: the gray areas represent the
periods of crises whose names are indicated in the blue boxes. Sources: RFA official docu-
ments; IMF; World Bank; Reinhart-Rogoff database on financial crises; ESM calculations.]
5.2 The role of particular countries in shaping G20
reform agendas
5.2.1 The country chairing the G20 meetings
The academic literature on public policy and International Political Econ-
omy acknowledges that the G20 framework draws strength from its agenda-
setting and endorsement functions. Eccleston et al. (2014) define the G20’s
endorsement function as the “capacity to shape the global reform agenda
by promoting, legitimising and energising the work of specialised, technical
regulatory organisations and networks.” My paper further argues that the
country assuming the G20 presidency can play an important role in setting
G20 reform agendas and leading discussions.
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Figure 4: Evolution of GFSN-related keywords [Sources: RFA official documents;
G20 official documents; ESM calculations.]
Although there are no formal votes on the basis of fixed voting shares
within the G20 framework, the chairing country has some room for manoeu-
vre through preparatory work before the Leaders’ Summit. As a general
practice since the Korean presidency in 2010,10 the G20 chair rotates between
members on an annual basis and is drawn from different regional groupings
(see Table 4) two years in advance. In the meantime, the forthcoming coun-
try chair has enough time to set up G20 Task Forces (often as technical
expert groups in the Ministry of Finance and in the Central Bank) and to
organise the coordination work (often assumed by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs or a dedicated service attached to the executive power directly). The
chairing country would normally work on selecting relevant policy topics to
be adopted by Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of all G20
countries in their spring meeting each year. For this purpose, technical Task
Forces as well as G20 Sherpas will prepare technical ground and negotiate
on key reform items through regular meetings or high-level seminars. There
is often an emblematic theme that the chairing country does its utmost to
promote to mark its footprint. This emblematic topic was “Strengthening
10From 2008 to 2010, the G20 Leaders’ Summit took place every six months. The annual
G20 Leaders’ Summit was institutionalized after the Korean presidency.
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the GFSN” for Korea and “Reforms in the International Monetary System”
for France. Both countries — and to a lesser extent Russia — have been key
players in promoting reforms of the GFSN.
As a matter of fact, one may think that countries with the following
features could have strong interests in enhancing the GFSN as a worldwide
financial backstop: 1) a small open economy that faces volatile capital flows;
2) has experienced financial reversals or “sudden stops” in the past; 3) is
involved in regional financial integration. Korea suffered very much from
massive capital outflows during both the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and
the Global Financial Crisis in 2009. According to Mr. Choongsoo Kim,
Governor of the Bank of Korea from April 2010 to March 2014, “Korea can
inevitably suffer massive shocks even despite its greatly increased foreign
reserves - due to abrupt outflows of overseas capital caused by international
financial market turbulence.”11 The onset of the Global Financial Crisis
proved that Korean foreign reserves — as a national line of defence — were
not sufficient to ensure foreign currency liquidity. Therefore, the country has
been fervently defending the institutionalisation of bilateral Central Bank
swap lines, further development of the CMI and replenishment of the IMF’s
resources.
France took over the tasks of reinforcing the IMS and its financial back-
stops in 2011. Although France had not experienced financial reversals in the
past, the country has been deeply involved in regional financial integration.
Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy, then French president, also manifested his personal
interest in the proposal of enhancing global liquidity provision against unex-
pected shocks at several occasions in the run-up to the G20 Cannes Summit.
“We first need to ask ourselves some questions. Are the liquidity instruments
available to us appropriate? Everyone knows that we need liquidity, but do
current instruments work? Who can answer yes to that question? Are they
sufficiently flexible? Who thinks we should say they are? Are they reversible?
Do we need to come up with other liquidity instruments? Should we expand
11See Mr. Choongsoo Kim’s speech for the 60th Anniversary of the Bank of Korea:
http://www.bis.org/review/r100617b.pdf.
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their scope to be able to respond to a systemic crisis affecting an entire region
instead of a country?” asked Mr. Sarkozy in a special high-level seminar on
Reform of the IMS in March 2011. A dedicated website on reforming the
GFSN and the IMS was also created during the French presidency.12
Looking to the future, will strengthening the GFSN be picked up again
as a key reform area in the forthcoming G20 meetings? Table 4 lists candi-
date countries that may assume the G20 presidency after 2016 based on the
available information on regional groupings. I believe that the debates on
the IMS and the GFSN might be reignited in the coming years, especially
from 2016 to 2018 when European countries or emerging economies that have
suffered from capital flow volatilities are most likely to take the lead as a G20
chair country. China also has strong incentives to promote the revamping of
the current IMS and strengthening of the GFSN.
Table 4: List of G20 chairing countries
Year Country Group
2010 Korea 5
2011 France 4
2012 Mexico 3
2013 Russia 2
2014 Australia 1
2015 Turkey 2
2016 China 5
201713 Germany, Italy, UK 4
2018 Argentina, Brazil 3
2019 Saudi Arabia, US, Canada 1
12http://www.imsreform.org.
13From 2017 to 2019, the chair country of G20 meetings has not been announced
yet. The last three lines in Table 4 are the author’s speculation based on the existing
practices of the G20 process (https://www.cigionline.org/publications/2010/11/
future-g20-process).
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5.2.2 Other divergent national interests
Apart from the critical role of the G20 chairing country, we can identify an
additional push for restructuring the GFSN from emerging market economies.
Reticence, however, can be sensed as well from countries that are less involved
in the IMS and financial regionalism, as well as from the “hegemon” of the
current IMS — the United States.
Emerging market economies have strongly advocated an overhaul of the
current IMS and its financial backstops. Given their increasing economic
power, they want to secure a better representation in the existing IFIs. More-
over, considering the lessons from the last wave of emerging market crises and
excessive capital flow volatilities during the Global Financial Crisis, emerg-
ing market economies do have incentives to secure supplementary financing
resources both for in-crisis funding and ex ante insurance against irrational
market behaviours. Therefore, we observe that the BRICS have called for
a bigger voice in existing IFIs and have been actively involved in setting up
new RFAs.
On the other hand, some advanced economies have never been actively in-
volved in any form of financial regionalisation (i.e. Australia and Canada).14
They may have incentives to maintain the status quo of financial safety nets
with a strong IMF at the centre. Hawkins et al. (2014), economists from the
Australian Treasury, clearly argue that the GFSN are at a risky “tipping
point to fragmentation”, because RFAs and bilateral arrangements have sig-
nificantly increased their lending capacity and have altered the balance of
resources within the global safety net. These countries may not be in favour
of a truly “multi-layered” GFSN.
Ultimately, there are some concerns relative to the current “hegemon”
of the IMS — the United States. First of all, institutional reforms in the
IMF often encounter US hurdles. As Truman (2014) argues, the US ad-
14Although Canada signed bilateral swap line agreements with the US and Mexico under
the North American Framework Agreement (NAFA), this mechanism was designed more
for Mexico than for Canada.
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ministration failed to implement the 2010 IMF reform package. Despite the
unfavourable political atmosphere in Washington, Obama’s administration
“should be faulted for delaying submitting the necessary legislation to the
US Congress, for inadequately explaining the importance of the IMF reform
package to Congress and the general public and for not adequately reaching
out to Republicans in Congress for their support on what historically has
been a bipartisan and nonpartisan topic.” Secondly, due to moral hazard
concerns, the US may not have incentives to play the role of “global dollar
lender-of-last-resort.” This is why the US was not in favour of institution-
alising bilateral swap lines in dollars between the US Federal Reserve Bank
and other Central Banks. The US Fed may regard institutionalised bilateral
swap lines as a way for some countries to secure cheap funding in dollars.
These countries may thus be less motivated to deal with inefficiency prob-
lems in their domestic financial markets (e.g. why domestic firms borrow
in US dollars in the first place). Therefore, for the US, pooling regional re-
sources, such as mutualised swap lines, may be the most appropriate format
to provide emergency liquidity in times of crises as regional arrangements
can be considered “dollar liquidities with limited responsibility (backed by
each member’s reserve contribution)” while institutionalised swap lines with
the US Fed are ultimately unconditional lending in dollars.
5.3 Impact of some institutional features of the G20
framework
Since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, the G20 framework has evolved
from a Finance Ministers’ forum to “the premier forum for [...] international
economic cooperation (G20 Pittsburgh Communique´)” gathering the highest-
level political leaders of the 20 biggest economies. The G20 derives some
strengths and weaknesses from its structure as a coordination forum instead
of a fully-fledged institution.
First, according to the literature on public policy making
(Princen and Rhinard, 2006), the issue initiation or agenda setting process of
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the G20 follows a “top down” structure. That is, many issues come onto the
agenda “from above”, from high-ranking political leaders (e.g. G20 Heads of
State). This process is often triggered by “a shared political problem, often
highlighted by a symbolic event (Princen and Rhinard, 2006),” the Global
Financial Crisis in the case of strengthening the GFSN. In moments of acute
crisis when crucial reforms must be implemented quickly, this “top down”
issue initiation process benefits from strong political backing, given that the
reform agenda is endorsed by the most influential countries, represented by
their political leaders. However, it is very hard for 20 countries to always
find a common political ground, especially when the immediate impact of
a crisis wears off. When political interests diverge, this “top down” issue
initiation process works far less well.
Moreover, as a coordination forum without a permanent secretariat and
supporting staff, the G20 needs to rely on specialized technocratic interna-
tional organisations (e.g. IMF) and government agencies (e.g. Ministry of
Finance and Central Bank) to deliver on its reform promises. Some schol-
ars in International Relations argue that it is through the “network gover-
nance” that the G20 framework has achieved some of its policy objectives
(see Eccleston et al. 2014). In this regard, the interaction between the G20
and the IMF seems crucial. The IMF executive management has been a key
player in G20 meetings. And IMF staff has provided extensive technical sup-
port to the G20, helping deliver crucial GFSN reforms. For example, in terms
of rationalisation of foreign reserves, the G20 tasked the IMF with providing
technical analysis to evaluate external imbalances and conducting the MAP.
Regarding the regional line of defence, the IMF was also the main draughts-
man of the common principles for RFA-IMF cooperation. As a technical
agent, the IMF has its say and influence in selecting those G20 reform pro-
posals which it wants to emphasise. One might think it much easier to obtain
the IMF Board’s approval regarding enhancing the IMF’s lending resources
and instruments. In comparison, the views at the Fund may diverge on the
appropriate size of RFAs and the optimal format for RFA-IMF cooperation,
even from a purely technical perspective.
Finally, one should not ignore the emergence of a new institution entirely
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initiated by G20 countries. This is the Financial Stability Board (FSB). For
some researchers, the FSB has the potential to become a de facto secretariat
of the G20 framework.
Three key features of the FSB deserve our attention. First, with some
minor differences, the FSB’s membership covers the 20 most important
economies (G20) as well as some major IFIs (e.g. the IMF and the World
Bank). The FSB provides an ideal forum for exchange and discussion among
Finance Ministries, Central Banks and representatives from the IMF. They
are all key players in the G20 framework as well. Second, the economic clout
of emerging market economies is well reflected here. Brazil, China, India and
Russia all have three seats in the Plenary (sole decision-making body), on an
equal footing with the US and other advanced economies. Third, the FSB
has a clearly defined mandate that fits in the broad context of safeguard-
ing global financial stability. The FSB is designed to “assess vulnerabilities
affecting the global financial system as well as to identify and review, on a
timely and ongoing basis within a macroprudential perspective, the regula-
tory, supervisory and related actions needed to address these vulnerabilities,
and their outcomes.”15
In this context, the FSB may have growing agenda-setting power in the
G20 framework. Therefore, in line with what has been said earlier, the
discussions on global financial stability are likely to be steered more towards
ex ante financial regulations and away from in-crisis financing. RFAs are,
notably, completely absent from the FSB. To keep GFSN-related topics alive,
RFAs may need to establish working relations with the FSB.
6 Conclusion
Since the Global Financial Crisis, the G20 has not only become the pre-
mier forum for policy coordination among major economies, but it has also
played an important role in promoting reforms to safeguard global financial
stability. This paper focuses on the commitments made by G20 countries to
15See http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/.
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strengthen the Global Financial Safety Net at and since the first G20 Lead-
ers’ Summit in Washington in 2008. The paper compares reform proposals
that they achieved with those they failed to deliver by the 2014 G20 Brisbane
Summit. Reforms that enhance financial resources and renew instruments
for emergency liquidity provision were substantially implemented. However,
institutional reforms concerning the governing structure of IFIs were delayed.
From a political economic perspective, the paper also analyses why the G20
delivered on the first set of reforms, but not on the second. The urgency of
responding to the crisis, the role of particular countries as well as institu-
tional characteristics of the G20 framework mainly determine the political
interests in this reform area.
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A G20 Summit Commitments and Deliver-
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 Date City  Level Commitments Progress/Achievements  Reference
11 Oct. 2008 Washington Ministerial 
Global level
 - Review the IMF's lending role (i.e. analytical framework, new 
instrument, access limits and financing terms)
 - Look forward to further work by EB on elements of the new 
quota formula and governance reform
 - The IMFC recommends members' acceptance of the fourth 
amendment of the Articles of Agreement (AoA) for a special one-
time allocation of SDRs
Global level
 - Approval by the BoG of the Resolution on quota and voice 
reforms (including the fourth amendment of the Fund's AoA 
to enhance voice and participation in the Fund) - IMF 2008 
Quotas and Governance reform, need further national 
approval 
 - Approval of the amendment broadening the Fund's 
investment authority as part of the Fund's new income 
model
 - Ongoing reassessment of the Fund's governance
Fin Ministers and CB governors 
Communiqué and IMFC communique
8-9 Nov. 2008 Sao Paulo Ministerial 
Global level
 - Multilateral development banks (MDB) to ensure arrangements 
needed for financing counter-cyclical policies in countries with a 
good track record and sound policies
- The Bretton Woods (BW) institutions to be comprehensively 
reformed with a greater voice and representation of Emerging 
market and developing countries (EMDC)
 - Review the adequacy of the resources of the IMF, the WB and 
other MDBs and stand ready to increase them where necessary
 - Underline the importance of strengthening the IMF surveillance
Global level
 - First step in the ongoing process of reforming the WBG
 - Short-Term Liquidity Facility (SLF) created by the IMF, Oct. 
2008
Fin Ministers and CB governors 
Communiqué
 14-15 Nov. 2008 Washington  Leader 
Global level
 - Encourage MDBs to use their full capacity in support of their 
development agenda
 - Ensure IMF, WB and MDB have sufficient resources/instruments 
to continue playing their role in overcoming the crisis. 
 - By March 2009 IFIs to review and adapt their lending instruments
 - Ensure EMDC have greater voice and representation in the BW 
IFIs (medium-term actions)
 - IMF and the WB to revamp FSAP
Global level
 - New facilities introduced by the WB in the areas of 
infrastructure and trade finance (e.g. Fast-track facility) 
Leaders' declaration and action plan
14 Mar. 2009 Horsham Ministerial 
Global level
 - MDBs' capital to be increased
 - IMF resources to be increased (through NAB) and quota review 
to be accelerated
 - Package of quota and voice measures for the IMF decided in April 
2008 to be implemented swiftly. WB reforms to be completed by 
the Spring Meetings 2010
 - BRICS call for bigger voice
 - Heads of the IFIs should be appointed through open, merit based 
selection process
Global level
 - Progress made by the IMF and WB in introducing new and 
enhanced instruments including the development of a new 
high-access, quick-disbursing precautionary facility
Fin Ministers and CB governors 
Communiqué
 2 Apr. 2009 London  Leader 
Global level
 - Agreed to ratify urgently the fourth amendment to the IMF AoA
 - Support a general SDR allocation of $250bn
 - Commit to implementing the package of IMF quota and voice 
reforms agreed in April 2008 and call on the IMF to complete the 
next review of quotas by January 2011
 - The Fund's governors to be involved in providing strategic 
direction to the IMF and increasing accountability
 - The WB reforms agreed in October 2008 to be implemented by 
the 2010 Spring Meetings
 - MDBs lending capacity to be increased to $300bn over the next 
three years
 - Cooperation and coordination between IFIs should be 
strengthened to increase their effectiveness
 - Heads of the IFIs should be appointed through open, merit based 
selection process
Global level
 - G20 countries agreed to make an additional $850bn of 
resources through IFIs to support growth in EMDC
    - $250bn from IMF members
    - Expanded and more flexible NAB increased by up to 
$500bn
    - $100bn from MDBs lending facilities
 - Flexible Credit Line (FCL) created by the IMF in March 2009
Leaders' declaration and annexes
24 Apr. 2009 Washington Ministerial TBC TBC TBC
4-5 Sep. 2009 London Ministerial 
Global level
 - Reiterated commitment to ensure MDBs capital increase  
 - 2008 IFI governance reforms to be completed by Spring 2010 for 
WB and January 2011 for IMF
 - Commitment to increase accountability, strengthen the 
involvement of Fund Governors in strategic oversight and agree to 
move to an open transparent and merit-based selection of IFI 
management
Global level 
- Close to completing the delivery of $850bn of additional 
resources agreed in April 2009 
Fin Ministers and CB governors 
Communiqué
 24-25 Sep. 2009 Pittsburgh  Leader 
Global level
 - Shift in IMF quota share to DEMDC of at least 5% and protect the 
voting share of the poorest
 - By the quota review of January 2011, discuss the size of any 
increase in IMF quotas, size and composition of the Executive 
Board (EB), ways of enhancing the Board's effectiveness, selection 
process of heads and senior leadership
 - The package of IMF quota and voice reforms agreed in April 2008 
to be implemented swiftly
 - Urged for a dynamic formula at the WB
 - WB capital increase to be implemented by 2010H1 (+ use of 
callable capital)
 - Need to increase of at least 3% of voting power for EMDC at the 
WB
Global level
 - $500bn delivered to a renewed and expanded IMF NAB
 - SDR allocations of $283bn in total made by the IMF
 - The Fund's medium-term concessional lending capacity is 
doubled (With the new income model and funds from 
internal and other sources) 
 - Forth amendment to the AoA became effective
Leaders' declaration and documents
6-7 Nov. 2009 St. Andrews Ministerial 
Global level
 - The representation and governance reforms agreed in Pittsburgh 
to be delivered by the 2010 Spring meetings for the WB and 
January 2011 for the IMF
 - The 2008 quota and voice reforms in the IMF to be completed
 - The review of WB and Regional Development Banks (RDB) capital 
to be completed 
 - Review the mandate of the IMF 
 - Replenishment of IDA and the African Development Fund
Fin Ministers and CB governors 
Communiqué
22-23 Apr. 2010 Washington Ministerial 
Global level
 - Urged progress to deliver on the representation of the IFI agreed 
in Pittsburgh
 - Urged the IMF to deliver the quota and governance reforms by 
the November Seoul Summit
Global level
The IMF Board approved the expanded NAB of SDR 367bn 
(waiting for ratification)
Fin Ministers and CB governors 
Communiqué
4-5 Jun. 2010 Busan Ministerial 
Global level
 - Call for an acceleration of the substantial work still needed for 
the IMF to complete the quota and governance reform by the 
Seoul Summit (Pittsburgh commitments)
 - Reiterated the urgency of implementing the April 2008 package 
of IMF quota and voice reform
 - Urging the implementation of the expanded NAB reform
Global level
 - Agreement on the WB voice reform to increase the voting 
power of EDMC by 3.13% + dynamic formula
 - Agreement for substantial capital increases and 
institutional reforms at the WB, IADB, EBRD and AfDB
Regional level
 - Creation of the EFSF by euro area Member States
Fin Ministers and CB governors 
Communiqué
 26-27 Jun. 2010 Toronto  Leader 
Global level
 - Ensure ratification of the 2008 IMF quota and voice reforms by 
Seoul Summit and expansion of the new NAB  (the majority of G20 
countries have ratified the 2008 IMF quota and voice reform and a 
number of G20 members have formally accepted the recently 
agreed reforms to the expanded NAB)
 - Ensure that the IMF's concessional financing for the poorest 
countries be expanded by $6 bn
 - Task Finance Ministers (FM) and Central bank Governors (CBG) to 
prepare policy options to strengthen global financial safety nets 
(national, regional and international efforts) 
 - Replenishment of IDA and the African Development Fund
Global level
 - $350bn capital increase in MDBs (Pittsburgh Summit 
commitment) doubling their lending (ADB, AfDB, IaDB, EBRD, 
IBRD, IFC)
 - The voice reforms agreed by shareholders at the World 
Bank (EMDC's voting power increase by 4.59% = 3.13% + 
1.46%)
 - Mobilization of $750bn from the IMF to support IMF 
members' needs for crisis financing ($250bn from immediate 
bilateral loans and note purchase + $500bn from NAB)
 - IMF implemented a $250bn new general allocation of SDRs
 - IMF established new early-warning exercise
Leaders' declaration and annexes 
(Annex 3)
2010 / Technical TBC TBC
Co-chairs financial report to 
Ministers
22-23 Oct. 2010 Gyeongju Ministerial 
Global level
 - Agreed on an ambitious set of proposals to reform the IMF's 
quota and governance (2010 Reforms of Quotas and Governance) 
    - Shifts in quota shares to EMDCs
    - Doubling of quotas
    - Comprehensive review of the quota formula by January 2013
    - 2 fewer advanced European chairs at the EB
    - Moving to an all-elected Board
Global level
 - Enhancement of the FCL including the extension of its 
duration and removal of the access cap. + recent clarification 
of the procedures for synchronized approval of the FCLs for 
multiple countries
 - Creation of the Precautionary Credit Line (PCL ) for 
countries with sound fundamentals/policies but moderate 
vulnerabilities
Fin Ministers and CB governors 
Communiqué
 11-12 Nov. 2010 Seoul  Leader 
Global and Regional level
 - To build a more stable and resilient International Monetary 
System (IMS) and to strengthen global financial safety nets (GFSN)
 - To promote a more structured approach to cope with shocks of a 
systemic nature and ways to improve collaboration btw RFAs and 
IMF
Global level
 - G20 endorsed the 2010 Reforms of Quotas and 
Governance agreed at the Gyeongju meeting
 - Countries with systemically important financial sectors are 
required to undergo FSAP since Sep. 2010
 Leaders' declaration and Summit 
document
18-19 Feb. 2011 Paris Ministerial 
Global level
 - Agreed on a work program to strengthen the functioning of the 
IMS
Global level
 - IMF BoG approved 2010 Quotas and Governance Reforms 
National level
 - Agreed on a set of indicators for external imbalances 
(reserve adequacy)
Fin Ministers and CB governors 
Communiqué
31 Mar. 2011 Nanjing Technical
Global and regional level
 - How to strengthen partnerships with RFAs
/ DSK, NS speeches
14-15 Apr. 2011 Washington Ministerial 
Global level
 - Agreed to focus our work in the short term on assessing 
developments in global liquidity, a country specific analysis 
regarding drivers of reserve accumulation, … an improved toolkit to 
strengthen the global financial safety nets, enhanced cooperation 
between the IMF and RFAs, etc.
 - Will work to complete the steps required to implement the 2010 
quota and governance reform by the Annual Meetings of 2012
Global level
 - Entry into force and the activation of the expanded and 
more flexible NAB
 - Entry into force of the IMF 2008 Quotas and Voice Reforms 
(shift in representation to EMDC, enhanced voice and 
participation of LIC, etc.)
National level
 - Indicative guidelines on global imbalances agreed (against 
which each of the indicators agreed in February will be 
assessed)
Fin Ministers and CB governors 
Communiqué
22-23 Sep. 2011 Washington Ministerial 
Regional level
 - the Euro area will Implementation of the decisions taken by EA 
leaders on 21 July 2011 to increase the capacity and the flexibility 
of the EFSF
Fin Ministers and CB governors 
Communiqué
14-15 Oct. 2011 Paris Ministerial 
Global level
 - Called on the IMF to further consider new ways to provide on a 
case by case basis short-term liquidity to countries facing 
exogenous, including systemic, shocks building on existing 
instruments and facilities and called on the IMF to develop 
concrete proposals by the Cannes Summit
 - Committed that the IMF must have adequate resources 
 - Call for the full implementation of the 2010 quota and 
governance reform of the IMF
 -Look forward to a criteria-based path to broaden the SDR basket
Global and National level
 - Continue the work on assessing developments on global liquidity, 
country specific analysis of drivers of reserve accumulation, 
avoiding persistent exchange rates misalignments and the role of 
the SDR
Regional level
 - Completed implementation of the decisions taken by EA 
leaders on 21 July 2011 to increase the capacity and the 
flexibility of the EFSF
- Adopted common principles for cooperation between the 
IMF and RFAs
Fin Ministers and CB governors 
Communiqué, G20 Principles for IMF-
RFA cooperation, Capital Flows, Local 
currency bond markets
 3-4 Nov. 2011 Cannes  Leader 
Global level
 - Support the IMF in putting forward the new Precautionary and 
Liquidity Line (PLL)
 - Support the IMF in putting forward a single emergency facility to 
provide non-concessional financing for emergency needs (waiting 
for the IMF to expeditiously discuss and finalize both project
 - Stand ready to ensure additional resources could be mobilized in 
a timely manner and ask our FMs by their next meeting to work on 
deploying a range of various options including bilateral 
contributions to the IMF, SDR, and voluntary contributions to an 
IMF special structure such as an administered account
 - Committed to implement in full the 2010 quota and governance 
reform of the IMF
 - Review the composition of the SDR basket in 2015 and call for 
further analytical work of the IMF in this regard
National level
 - Call on the IMF to continue its work on drivers and metrics of 
reserve accumulation
Global level
 -  Recent improvements to the IMF surveillance toolkit 
including the consolidated multilateral surveillance report 
and spillover reports and ask the IMF to continue to improve 
upon these exercises and methodology
Regional level
 - Agreed on common principles for cooperation between 
the IMF and RFAs
 Leaders' declaration
25-26 Feb. 2012 Mexico City Ministerial 
Global level
 - Committed to implement in full the 2010 governance and quota 
reform by the agreed date of the 2012 IMF/WB annual meeting
 - Committed to a comprehensive review of the quota formula to 
better reflect economic weights by January 2013 
 - Committed to the completion of the next general review of 
quotas by January 2014
 - Contribute to the ongoing process to strengthen the surveillance 
framework of the IMF
Global level
 - Review of the adequacy of IMF resources started
 - Other options mentioned by Leaders in Cannes such as 
SDRs are under review
Regional level
 - EA countries will reassess the strength of their support 
facilities in March
Fin Ministers and CB governors 
Communiqué
20 Apr. 2012 Washington Ministerial 
Global level
 - Firm commitments to increase IMF resources by over $430bn in 
addition to the quota increase under the 2010 reform. These 
resources would be channelled through temporary bilateral loans 
and note purchase agreements to the IMF's GRA
 - Reaffirmed commitment to fully implement the 2010 governance 
and quota reform by the 2012 IMF/WB Annual meeting
 - Contribute towards a comprehensive review of the IMF quota 
formula by January 2013 and the completion of the next general 
review of quotas by January 2014
Global level
 - Progress made by the IMF in advancing consideration of an 
integrated surveillance decision
 - Ongoing work by the IMF to produce an external sector 
report
Regional level
 - EA strengthened in March European firewalls as part of 
broader reform efforts and the availability of central bank 
swap lines
Fin Ministers and CB governors 
Communiqué
20 Apr. 2012 Washington Ministerial 
Global level
 - Committed to take the necessary actions to secure global 
financial stability
Joint Statement by IMFC/G20 FinMin 
and CBG
 18-19 Jun. 2012 Los Cabos  Leader 
Global level
 -  Firm commitments to increase the resources available to the 
IMF (exceeding $450 bn) + quota increase under the 2010 Reform
 - Commitment to implement in full the 2010 quota and 
governance reform by the agreed date of the 2012 IMF/WB annual 
meetings
 - Complete the comprehensive review of the quota formula by 
January 2013 and to complete the next general review of quotas by 
January 2014
 - The current surveillance framework should be significantly 
enhanced, including through a better integration of bilateral and 
multilateral surveillance with a focus on global, domestic and 
financial stability, including spillovers from countries' policies. 
Regional level
 - Eurogroup's announcement of support for Spain's financial 
restructuring authority
 Leaders' declaration
4-5 Nov. 2012 Mexico City Ministerial 
Global level
 - Call on the finalization of the remaining bilateral agreements 
(IMF resources) and call on members who have yet to complete the 
process to do so asap
 - Committed to completing the comprehensive review of the quota 
formula
Regional level
 - Look forward to the completion of the technical discussions on 
the future of the ESM Direct bank recapitalisation (DRI)
Global level
 - Continuation of the process to strengthen IMF resources 
and enhance the IMF's role in crisis prevention and 
resolution (total pledged resources added up to USD461bn, 
formalization of the first set totalling USD286bn)
 - IMF Quota review started since February 2012. EB held 
further discussions on the matter
 - Strengthening of the IMF's surveillance framework through 
the adoption of the new Integrated Surveillance Decision 
(July 2012) + introduction of the Pilot External Sector Report
Regional level
 - Establishment of the ESM
Fin Ministers and CB governors 
Communiqué
15-16 Feb. 2013 Moscow Ministerial 
Global level
 - Call on the IMF and lending countries to finalize the remaining 
agreements
 - Urgent need to ratify the 2010 IMF quota and governance reform 
 - Committed to agree on the quota formula and complete the 15th 
GQR by January 2014 as agreed at the Seoul Summit
Global and Regional level
 - Will assess scope for a more effective dialogue btw RFAs, as well 
as enhancing cooperation and increasing complementarities btw 
the IMF and RFAs
Global level
 - Progress made since the IMF and WB AM in Tokyo on G20 
Leaders' commitment in Los Cabos to provide the IMF with 
resources via bilateral Arrangements
 - IMF EB reported to the BoG on the outcome of the quota 
formula review
Fin Ministers and CB governors 
Communiqué
17-18 Apr. 2013 Washington Technical
Regional level
 - RFA basic features
 - Existing RFA-IMF cooperation
 - Options for enhancing cooperation and the way forward
/ Issues Note for G20/IMF Seminar
18-19 Apr.2013 Washington Ministerial 
Global level
 -  Committed to agree on the quota formula and complete the 
15th General Quota Review (GQR) by January 2014 as agreed at the 
Seoul Summit and reiterated in Cannes and Los Cabos
Regional level
 - Recognizing the importance of effective global safety nets and 
RFAs
 - Discuss possible ways to further enhance cooperation between 
IMF and RFAs in order to assess possible options for further policy 
recommendations by the time of the Leaders' Summit in St 
Petersburg
Global level
 - Supported the IMF EB's decision to integrate the process 
of reaching a final agreement on a new quota formula with 
the 15th GRQ
Regional level
 - The IMF work on stocktaking of its engagement with RFAs, 
as well as the recent G20/IMF seminar that reviewed 
developments in RFAs and explored options for enhancing 
their cooperation with the IMF
Fin Ministers and CB governors 
Communiqué
19-20 Jul. 2013 Moscow Ministerial 
Global level
 -  Committed to agree on the quota formula and complete the 
15th GQR by January 2014 as agreed at the Seoul Summit and 
reiterated in Cannes and Los Cabos
Regional level
 - Recognizing the importance of effective global safety nets and 
RFAs
 - Reaffirm the common principles for cooperation between the 
IMF and RFAs, look forward to a flexible and voluntary dialogue 
between the IMF-RFAs and a dialogue among RFAs
/
Fin Ministers and CB governors 
Communiqué
 5-6 Sep. 2013 St. Petersburg  Leader 
Global level
 -  Committed to agree on the quota formula and complete the 
15th GQR by January 2014 as agreed at the Seoul Summit and 
reiterated in Cannes and Los Cabos
Global and Regional level
 - Recognizing the importance of effective global safety nets
 - Reaffirm the common principles for cooperation between the 
IMF and RFAs and ask FM and CBG to follow the developments
Global level
 - The vast majority of previously committed resources have 
been made available to the IMF through bilateral loan or 
note purchase agreements
 Leaders' declaration
10-11 Oct. 2013 Washington Ministerial 
Global level
 -  Committed to agree on the quota formula and complete the 
15th GQR by January 2014 as agreed at the Seoul Summit and 
reiterated in Cannes and Los Cabos
 -  Urged ratification of the 2010 IMF quota and governance reform
/
Fin Ministers and CB governors 
Communiqué
18-19 Dec. 2013 Seoul Technical
Global level
 - Reduce the stigma of IMF resources
Global and Regional level
 - Interaction bwt various aspects of the GFSN
National level
 - Reduce reliance on self-insurance measures
/
Korean government summary of G20 
Seoul Conference
22-23 Feb. 2014 Sydney Ministerial 
Global level
 - Commitment to ratify the 2010 reforms (deeply regret that the 
IMF quota and governance reforms agreed to in 2010 have not yet 
become effective and that the 15th GRQ was not completed by 
January 2014)
 - Urged the US to do so before our next meeting in April.
 - In April 2014 G20 will take stock of progress towards meeting this 
priority and complementing the 15th GRQ by Jan 2015
/
Fin Ministers and CB governors 
Communiqué
10-11 Apr. 2014 Washington Ministerial 
Global level
 - Committed to maintain a strong and adequately resourced IMF
 - Commitment to implement the 2010 reforms
 - In case of non ratification by end 2014, commit to develop 
alternative options for next steps
/
Fin Ministers and CB governors 
Communiqué
20-21 Sep. 2014 Cairns Ministerial 
Global level
 - Committed to ensure the continued effectiveness of global safety 
nets
 - Committed to maintain a strong and adequately resourced IMF
 - Urged the US to ratify the reforms agreed to in 2010
/
Fin Ministers and CB governors 
Communiqué
 15-16 Nov. 2014 Brisbane  Leader 
Global level
 - Committed to ensure a stronger and more resilient financial 
system
 - Urged for ratification of IMF quota and governance reforms. 
 - In case of non ratification by end 2014, committed to develop 
alternative options for next steps
/
Leaders' declaration
Action plan
